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CAUTION! HOT BALLOT: EXAMINING
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN
CHAMNESS V. BOWEN
Leah Johannesson
I. INTRODUCTION
Michael Chamness was a long-shot candidate.1 He ran in
California’s 36th congressional district election on May 17, 2011,
and appeared on the primary election ballot as having “No Party
Preference.”2 Although his voter registration form stated his
membership in the Coffee Party,3 California’s election law
foreclosed him from stating that preference on the ballot.4 Indeed,
“the ballot . . . is the last thing the voter sees before he makes his
choice,” and party preference designations provide an important
voting cue.5 Before the election, Chamness filed suit, alleging that
the law, Senate Bill 6 (SB 6), violated his First Amendment rights by
forcing him to indicate that he had no party preference.6
 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science,
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. Thank you to Professor Jessica A.
Levinson for teaching me how to think about campaign-finance law, for her guidance and support
through law school, and for her feedback on this Comment. And thank you to the editors and
staffers of Volume 47 and 48 of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their work on this
issue.
1. In his candidate statement, Chamness implored voters, “So I ask for your vote, but
realize it’s a long shot.” Michael Chamness, Chamness for Congress Message, SMART VOTER
(March 2011), http://www.smartvoter.org/2011/05/17/ca/la/vote/chamness_m/paper1.html.
2. Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2013).
3. Chamness, supra note 1. The Coffee Party USA describes itself as “a grassroots, nonpartisan movement that aims to restore the principles and spirit of democracy in America.” Who
We Are, THE COFFEE PARTY USA, http://www.coffeepartyusa.com/about (last visited Oct. 25,
2013). The Coffee Party operates independently of political parties and does not endorse
candidates. Id.
4. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105(a) (West 2011) (amended 2012).
5. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 532 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see Rosen v.
Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1992) (explaining that “party candidates are afforded a
‘voting cue’ on the ballot in the form of a party label which research indicates is the most
significant determinant of voting behavior”).
6. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1114, 1116; see also Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief at 2, 13–15, Chamness v. Bowen, No. CV 11-01479 ODW (FFMx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23,

967

CAUTION! HOT BALLOT

968

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

11/24/2014 12:50 AM

[Vol. 47:967

When the case reached the Ninth Circuit, the court rejected
Chamness’s First Amendment claim and upheld the law requiring
him to choose the ballot label “No Party Preference” or a blank
space, ruling that the law was reasonably related to achieving the
state’s interest in regulating elections.7 The court explained that
strict-scrutiny review, which requires the state to show that the law is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, did not
apply.8 Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit has noted, voting regulations
generally do not receive strict-scrutiny review.9
However, this Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit should
have applied strict scrutiny to Chamness’s claim. Part II of this
Comment discusses the factual and procedural background of the
case, and Part III sets forth the court’s reasoning. Part IV will briefly
discuss United States Supreme Court jurisprudence in ballot-access
cases. Next, Part V argues that (1) the law at issue, SB 6, severely
burdened candidates and voters’ First Amendment rights; and (2) the
state’s interests, relied on in the opinion, are likely not sufficiently
compelling to justify this burden. Part V also highlights possible
challenges to SB 6. Lastly, Part VI concludes that applying strict
scrutiny offers warranted constitutional protection for candidates and
voters.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The California Legislature enacted SB 6 to implement
Proposition 14, which created the open primary, top-two electoral
system in California.10 When Chamness ran for office, SB 6 limited
primary election candidates to three options for party preference
designations: candidates could (1) designate their political party
preference; (2) state “No Party Preference”; or (3) opt to leave the
party preference space blank.11 California Secretary of State Debra
Bowen interpreted “political party” to mean a qualified political
2011) (alleging that “minor-party candidates are forced to falsely state on the ballot that they have
‘No Party Preference’” in violation of the United States Constitution).
7. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116.
8. Id. at 1116–19.
9. Id. at 1116 (citing Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011)).
10. Id. at 1113; Top Two Candidates Open Primary Act and Voter-Nominated Offices,
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/statewide
-elections/2012-primary/new-open-primary-info.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). Proposition 14
has been codified as article II, sections 5 and 6, of the California Constitution. .
11. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105(a) (West 2011) (amended 2012).
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party.12 Thus, candidates may only designate a preference for
qualified political parties, such as the Democratic or Republican
Parties.13 Conversely, at the time of the contested election,
candidates who preferred a non-qualified political party could only
state “No Party Preference” or leave the party preference space
blank.14
Michael Chamness ran for office in California’s 36th
congressional district on May 17, 2011.15 He sought to designate
himself as an Independent by using the label “Independent” in the
party preference space.16 Instead, he appeared on the ballot with “No
Party Preference” next to his name because he did not designate a
preference for a qualified political party.17
On February 17, 2011, Chamness brought suit against Secretary
Bowen and Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk
Dean C. Logan, challenging the constitutionality of SB 6.18
Chamness alleged that the law violated his free-speech rights
because it forced him to falsely state that he had no party
preference.19 In fact, he had a party preference: the Coffee Party.20
Arguably, he could have opted to leave the party preference
space blank, and he would not have been forced to state anything.
However, on appeal, he maintained that the blank space option did
not present a constitutionally permissible alternative because
candidates who prefer a qualified party can designate their party
preference, while Chamness, a candidate who identified with a minor
12. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1113. For a political party to become a qualified political party,
the party must meet conditions set forth in California Elections Code section 5100.
13. ELEC. § 13105(a). For a list of additional qualified political parties, see Qualified
Political Parties for the June 3, 2014, Primary Election, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE
DEBRA BOWEN, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/political-parties/qualified-political-party.htm
(last visited Oct. 25, 2013). When Chamness ran for office, California had six qualified political
parties. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1113.
14. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1113.
15. Plaintiff’s Opening Brief at 11, Chamness, 722 F.3d 1110 (No. 11-56449).
16. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1114 n.2.
17. Id. at 1114. “[H]e appeared on the ballot as:
MICHAEL CHAMNESS
No Party Preference
Non-profit Organization Consultant”
Id.; see also ELEC. § 13105(a) (“If the candidate designates no [qualified] political party, the
phrase ‘No Party Preference’ shall be printed instead of the party preference identification.”).
18. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1114; Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra
note 6, at 1, 13.
19. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 6, at 2, 13–15.
20. See Chamness, supra note 1.
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party, could not.21
On August 23, 2011, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.22 Chamness appealed, arguing
in part that the law denied him an accurate ballot label and thereby
severely burdened his First Amendment rights.23 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the district
court’s ruling.24
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Ninth Circuit held that Chamness “failed to establish that
SB 6 severely burdened his rights.”25 According to the court,
Chamness did not explain how the regulation hindered the specific
message that he wished to convey, in part because he failed to
demonstrate that “Independent” and “No Party Preference” conveyed
different meanings.26 Specifically, he did not establish that the “No
Party Preference” label created “negative connotations even to wellinformed voters.”27 Furthermore, if Chamness thought the “No Party
Preference” label harmed his candidacy, the court explained, he
could have left the party preference space blank.28 Additionally, the
court held that the regulation was “viewpoint neutral as to the
required term ‘No Party Preference,’” because the law banned the
term “Independent” for all candidates.29 For these reasons, the court
concluded that the burden on speech was slight.30
Because the burden was slight, the court did not apply strict
scrutiny.31 Rather, the court examined whether the state’s regulatory
interests justified the slight speech burden that SB 6 imposed on
candidates desiring the designation “Independent.”32 The court
21. Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, supra note 15, at 38 n.152.
22. Chamness v. Bowen, No. CV 11-01479 ODW (FFMx), 2011 WL 3021492, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 2011), aff’d, 722 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013). The court also granted summary
judgment in favor of intervener-defendants California Independent Voter Project, Abel
Maldonado, and Californians to Defend the Open Primary. Id.
23. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116; Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, supra note 15, at 26–30.
24. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1122.
25. Id. at 1116.
26. Id. at 1117–18.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1118.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
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explained that “[n]ondiscriminatory restrictions that impose a lesser
burden on speech rights need only be reasonably related to achieving
the state’s important regulatory interests.”33 The court concluded that
the state’s interests in preventing voter confusion and managing its
ballots justified the slight burden on First Amendment rights.34
Notably, the court treated Chamness as a “genuine
[I]ndependent.”35 As stated by Richard Winger, the editor and
publisher of Ballot Access News, in Chamness’s Complaint,
Chamness “wanted the label ‘[I]ndependent[,]’” but “[i]n later briefs
he suggested that he really want[ed] the label ‘Coffee Party.’”36 The
court did not address whether he wanted a label for a non-qualified
political party and instead expressed “no views as to the validity of
California’s restriction against stating preferences for non-qualified
parties.”37
After the district court entered judgment, and before the Ninth
Circuit heard the case, California removed the blank space option
from section 13105(a) of the California Election Code.38 Thus,
candidates can no longer opt to leave the party preference space
blank.39 The court explained that Chamness did not argue “that the
presence or absence of the blank space option” affected the law’s
constitutionality and “expressed[ed] no view as to whether the
removal of the blank space option compels speech by requiring
candidates who prefer a non-qualified party to falsely state that they
have no party preference.”40 In other words, the Ninth Circuit did not
address how removal of the blank space option may affect the law’s
constitutionality, because, according to the court, Chamness only
argued that the law unconstitutionally denied him the label
“Independent.”41

33. Id. at 1116 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308
F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002)).
34. Id. at 1118–19.
35. Richard Winger, Independent Candidate Loses in Ninth Circuit, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS,
Aug. 2013, at 2; see also Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1114 n.2 (“As in his complaint, Chamness
argues on appeal only that he wished to designate himself ‘Independent’ on the primary election
ballot, not that he must be allowed to identify himself as a member of the ‘Coffee Party.’”).
36. Id.
37. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118 n.5.
38. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105(a) (West 2012); Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116 n.4.
39. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105(a) (West 2012); Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116 n.4.
40. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116 n.4.
41. Id.
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IV. THE CURRENT TEST
Whether a ballot access restriction imposes a severe burden or a
reasonable, non-discriminatory burden dictates the level of scrutiny
employed by the court.42 If the state law imposes a severe burden on
the right to vote and associate, the court will apply strict scrutiny.43
Under this standard, the court must determine whether the ballot
access restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest.44 For example, in Williams v. Rhodes,45 the
Supreme Court held that election laws that kept minor political
parties off of the ballot imposed severe burdens on the right to vote
and the right to associate.46 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court
concluded that the state failed to demonstrate any “compelling
interest” that would justify those burdens.47 Williams has been
described as the Supreme Court’s high-water mark for protecting
ballot access by minor parties.48
Conversely, regulations that impose a lesser burden on First
Amendment rights trigger a lower level of scrutiny.49 For example, in
Anderson v. Celebrezze,50 the Supreme Court held that a statute
requiring an independent candidate for President to adhere to an
early filing deadline unconstitutionally burdened voting and
associational rights of the independent candidate’s supporters.51
Anderson instructs:
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude
of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to

42. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
43. See id.; Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1117.
44. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116.
45. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
46. Id. at 26, 30–31.
47. Id. at 31; Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties
Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 186 (1991) (discussing how Williams applied a
“rigorous strict scrutiny standard”).
48. Jessica A. Levinson, Is the Party Over? Examining the Constitutionality of Proposition
14 as It Relates to Ballot Access for Minor Parties, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 463, 479 (2011); see
also Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties: Correcting the Supreme Court’s
Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1288 (2005) (“The Court’s first major foray
into the field of ballot-access was also the high-water mark of protection afforded third-party
challengers.”).
49. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
50. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
51. Id. at 805–06.
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vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court
must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each
of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s
rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing
court in a position to decide whether the challenged
provision is unconstitutional.52
This balancing test has been likened to intermediate scrutiny.53
Notably, the Supreme Court in Anderson protected ballot access for
Independent candidates.54 However, subsequent cases employing this
lower level of scrutiny have upheld ballot restrictions as reasonably
related to a state’s regulatory interests.55
V. ANALYSIS
The Chamness court should have applied strict scrutiny to
Chamness’s claim. Contrary to the court’s finding, SB 6 heavily
burdened Chamness’s rights and the rights of voters to associate for
the advancement of political beliefs, which triggers strict scrutiny.
Additionally, the court overestimated the importance of the
government interests relied on in the opinion, which likely do not
justify the heavy burden on First Amendment rights. Had the court
applied strict scrutiny and expressed a view on California’s disparate
treatment of candidates who prefer non-qualified political parties, the
constitutionality of SB 6 would likely have been a closer question.

52. Id. at 789.
53. Levinson, supra note 48, at 493.
54. Anderson, 460 U.S at 805–06.
55. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369–70 (1997) (“[T]he burdens
Minnesota’s fusion ban imposes on the New Party’s associational rights are justified by
‘correspondingly weighty’ valid state interests in ballot integrity and political stability.”); see also
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 440 (1992) (“[L]egitimate interests asserted by the State
are sufficient to outweigh the limited burden that the write-in voting ban imposes upon Hawaii’s
voters.”).
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A. SB 6 Imposes a Severe Burden on
Candidates’ and Voters’ Rights to Associate
for the Advancement of Political Beliefs
First, SB 6 impinges on candidates’ associational rights because
it treats candidates with political preferences “outside the existing
political parties” differently from candidates with qualified party
preferences.56 In Anderson, the Supreme Court held: “[A] burden
that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on
independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on associational
choices protected by the First Amendment.”57 But in Chamness, the
court found that SB 6 treated all candidates equally: it allowed all
candidates to put their name on the primary ballot, and it prohibited
all candidates from using the label “Independent.”58 However, SB 6
allows only a certain group of candidates, those that prefer qualified
parties, to appear on the primary ballot with an affirmative party
preference label.59 This results in a recognition advantage for those
who prefer qualified parties.60 Accordingly, the burden falls
unequally on candidates who prefer non-qualified parties,
necessitating heightened review.61
Second, and more importantly,62 SB 6 infringes on voters’ rights
to associate and effectively vote. When viewing the primary election
ballot, non-qualified party voters cannot determine which candidates
identify with their specific interests, whereas qualified party voters
can.63 In Anderson v. Martin,64 the Supreme Court recognized the
importance of ballot labels attached to a candidate’s name, as the
state places a label on a candidate “at the most crucial stage in the
electoral processthe instant before the vote is cast.”65 Ballot labels
help voters associate with their candidates of choice and cast

56. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793–94 (citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982)
(plurality opinion)).
57. Id. at 793–94.
58. Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2013).
59. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105(a) (West 2011) (amended 2012).
60. See Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1992); Levinson, supra note 48, at 509.
61. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793.
62. E.g., id. at 794 (emphasizing the “particular importance” of a law’s effect on voters’
associational rights).
63. See Bachrach v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 415 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Mass. 1981).
64. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
65. Id. at 402 (holding that the designation of a candidate’s race on the ballot violated the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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meaningful votes that reflect their ideology or affiliation.66 In
Williams, the Supreme Court held that the right to associate and the
right to effectively vote rank “among our most precious freedoms”;67
and thus, here, the court should apply strict scrutiny.
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit declined to assume harm to
voters’ rights “in the absence of evidence.”68 As the court explained,
Chamness did not provide empirical evidence to establish a
difference between “Independent” and “No Party Preference.”69
Furthermore, he did not establish that voters would vote differently
based on the labels.70 Because the court lacked evidence, it assumed
that “the ballot was presented to a well-informed electorate” who
understood California’s ballot labels.71 The court indicated that it
required evidence proving a “distinction in likely impact between
‘Independent’ on the one hand, and ‘No Party Preference,’ when
pitted against other ‘preference’ designations for California’s six
qualified parties.”72 Thus, the court’s opinion may have been
different if it had had such evidence.
Additionally, the Chamness court held that its decision did not
conflict with the Sixth Circuit case, Rosen v. Brown.73 In Rosen, the
Sixth Circuit invalidated a law that prohibited a non-party candidate
from having the ballot designation “Independent” or “Independent
candidate” by his name on a general election ballot, but provided
labels for Democratic and Republican candidates.74 There, non-party
candidates secured a position on the ballot through an independent
candidate’s nominating petition.75 The Rosen court, citing expert
testimony, found that “[w]ithout a designation next to an
Independent’s name on the ballot, the voter has no clue as to what
the candidate stands for.”76
66. Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Voting studies conducted since
1940 indicated that party identification is the single most important influence on political
opinions and voting.”).
67. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968).
68. Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2013).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1118 (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
454–55 (2008)).
72. See id. at 1120.
73. Id.; Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1992).
74. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 177–78.
75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.257 (West 2013); Rosen, 970 F.2d at 171.
76. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 172.
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The Ninth Circuit held that Chamness could not rely on Rosen.77
Unlike the plaintiff in Rosen, Chamness did not present evidence to
establish a difference between the meaning of “Independent” and
“No Party Preference.”78 Also, the specific party labels disputed in
Rosen (“Independent” and no designation versus “Democrat,” or
“Republican”) differed from the party labels disputed in Chamness
(“Independent” and “No Party Preference” versus qualified party
preference designations).79
Admittedly, in contrast to the Independent candidates in Rosen,
Chamness could use a label: “No Party Preference.” However, the
“No Party Preference” label inaccurately captured Chamness’s party
preference and therefore did not provide a meaningful voting cue to
voters.80 Furthermore, the studies and expert testimony in Rosen
discussed the general importance of ballot labels, including the
“Independent” label.81
Moreover, the court should not require proof to find that
designations influence the way voters cast their votes. In Washington
State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,82 where the
Supreme Court rejected a political party’s challenge to the state’s
open-primary, top-two electoral system,83 Chief Justice Roberts
explained in his concurring opinion that he would not require
political parties to establish voter perception through studies.84 In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued, “It does not take a study to
establish that when statements of party connection are the sole
77. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1120.
78. Id.
79. Id. Lastly, unlike the legislators in Rosen who enacted the law to preserve political
dominance of the Democratic and Republican Parties, the Chamness court held, “There does not
appear to be any legitimate argument that the law in this case seeks to insulate any political party
or parties from competition.” Id.
80. See Rosen, 970 F.2d at 172; Chamness, supra note 1.
81. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 172–73. However, the Rosen court stressed its reliance on evidence in
the form of expert testimony. The Rosen court distinguished the Fifth Circuit case Dart v. Brown,
which upheld a law that prevented minor-party candidates from stating their party affiliation on
the ballot. 717 F.2d 1491 (5th Cir. 1983). The Rosen court explained that the Fifth Circuit in Dart
recognized that a candidate’s lack of party affiliation on the ballot could impair voters’ rights, but
did not have evidence demonstrating such impairment. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 176. The Rosen court
further explained that, unlike the Dart court, it had such evidence. Id.
82. 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
83. Id. at 458–59.
84. Id. at 461–62 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Nothing in my analysis requires the parties to
produce studies regarding voter perceptions on [how voters interpret candidates’ designations],
but I would wait to see what the ballot says before deciding whether it is unconstitutional.”).
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information listed next to candidate names on the ballot, those
statements will affect voters’ perceptions of what the candidates
stand for, what the party stands for, and whom they should elect.”85
The Massachusetts Supreme Court case Bachrach v. Secretary
of Commonwealth86 is also instructive. In Bachrach, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and held that a
law prohibiting the ballot label “Independent” and instead requiring
candidates to state “Unenrolled” violated constitutional rights.87
Without citing empirical evidence, the court declared, “Unenrolled is
hardly a rallying cry” and indicated that the label “would have a
negative connotation for voters.”88 Like “Unenrolled” in Bachrach,
“No Party Preference” in Chamness could create a similar, negative
connotation for voters.89
B. The State’s Interests Likely
Do Not Justify SB 6
The Ninth Circuit held that SB 6 “is sufficiently supported by
the state’s important regulatory interests” in preventing voter
confusion and managing its ballots.90 But when applying strict
scrutiny, the court must determine whether the law furthers a
compelling state interest.91 Indeed, government interests rarely
survive strict-scrutiny review.92
First, the state’s interest in preventing voter confusion is weak at
best. The court explained that voters might confuse “Independent”
and the qualified “American Independent Party,” even though the
court assumed a well-informed electorate earlier in its opinion.93 “No
Party Preference” possibly misleads voters, because the label
85. Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. 415 N.E.2d 832 (Mass. 1981).
87. Id. at 836–37.
88. Id. at 836.
89. See Oral Argument at 09:09–10:15, Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013)
(No. 11-56303), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id=0000010402.
90. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118–19. The court did not rely on the government’s asserted
“‘interest in maintaining the distinction between qualified political parties and nonqualified
political bodies’ as justifying the ‘No Party Preference’ language.” Id. at 1118 n.5.
91. Id. at 1116.
92. “Only rarely are statutes sustained in the face of strict scrutiny. As one commentator
observed, strict-scrutiny review is ‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact.” Bernal v. Fainter,
467 U.S. 216, 219 n.6 (1984) (citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
93. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118.
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actually means no qualified party preference.94 Additionally, the law
denies voters information about candidates, because candidates who
prefer non-qualified parties cannot designate their actual party
preference on the ballot. Indeed, “[a] State’s claim that it is
enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by
restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with
some skepticism.”95 A ballot label that designates the candidate’s
actual party preference would lead to more information—rather than
create confusion—by providing voters with an important voting cue
about candidates.96
Granted, Chamness’s own example presents a case of possible
voter confusion. He ran for office affiliated with the Coffee Party,97
but sought the label “Independent” on the ballot.98 This could
confuse voters: is he an independent candidate or does he prefer the
Coffee Party? But the potential for voter confusion seems greater in a
system that denies information, instead of in a system that allows
voters to judge for themselves the candidate’s designation.99 Again,
the state’s claim regarding voter confusion should be viewed with
skepticism.100
Second, the state’s interest in managing its ballots is slightly
more compelling, but likely not sufficient to survive strict
scrutiny.101 As the Chamness court warned, questionable selfdesignations would require the state to make “case-by-case
governmental decisions regarding the acceptability of various selfdesignations.”102 Perhaps the state tried to minimize this type of
decision making by specifying a mechanical scheme for
designations.103
On the other hand, the state could manage its ballots while
94. See Oral Argument, supra note 89, at 31:00.
95. Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228 (1989) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 221 (1986)).
96. Levinson, supra note 48, at 504, 509.
97. Chamness, supra note 1.
98. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1114.
99. Levinson, supra note 48, at 504.
100. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
101. See Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118.
102. Id. at 1119.
103. See Oral Argument, supra note 89, at 16:30. However, Washington state makes those
decisions, as it allows candidates up to sixteen characters to designate their political party
preference, and provides for when the filing officer may intervene to edit, reject, or replace a
candidate’s self-designation. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 434-215-120 (2008).
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offering more than a small number of prescribed labels. The state
could avoid “questionable self-designation”104 with a less
burdensome regulation by allowing candidates to designate
themselves as preferring a non-qualified political party. For example,
in Rubin v. City of Santa Monica,105 the Ninth Circuit upheld a
California regulation that allowed candidates to designate their
occupations
while
prohibiting
non-occupational,
status
designations.106 Here, even if a new California regulation offered
more than a small number of prescribed labels, candidates would still
face restrictions like those seen in Rubin. The restrictions, in turn,
could limit candidates’ choice of designation and preclude candidates
from using the designation they feel best promotes their
candidacy.107 A less burdensome regulation could even exclude
Chamness from stating the term “Independent” because that label
does not indicate preference for a non-qualified party.108
Overall, the state’s interests relied on in Chamness likely do not
survive strict-scrutiny review.
C. This Case Provides Significant Guidance
to Future Challengers
After the election at issue in Chamness, the state eliminated the
blank space option.109 In Chamness, the Ninth Circuit relied on the
blank space option to conclude that the burden on Chamness’s
speech was slight.110 Specifically, the court maintained that if
Chamness disagreed with the message that “No Party Preference”
conveyed, he could have opted for the blank space option.111 Now,
this is no longer the case, as candidates who prefer a non-qualified
political party must state “Party Preference: None,”112 even if they
disagree with the message. Thus, future challengers may have a
stronger claim that the law impermissibly compels speech and
104. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1119.
105. 308 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 1015 (holding that ballot regulation prohibiting “status” designations did not
violate candidate’s free speech rights).
107. See Oral Argument, supra note 89, at 14:35.
108. See Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118 n.5 (explaining that Chamness did “not contend that
‘Independent’ is a political party”).
109. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105 (West 2012).
110. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118, 1119.
111. Id. at 1118.
112. ELEC. § 13105.
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therefore severely burdens their First Amendment rights.113
Chamness demonstrates the Ninth Circuit’s current requirement
that the challenger must introduce empirical evidence for the court to
find a severe burden on First Amendment rights. Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit seems to require evidence demonstrating the difference
between the desired label “I prefer the [non-qualified] party” and the
current label “Party Preference: None,” when presented against
preference designations for qualified parties.114
VI. CONCLUSION
Like Chamness’s candidacy, this was a long-shot case. Though
relying on precedent, which rarely subjects voting regulations to
strict scrutiny,115 the Ninth Circuit underestimated the rights at stake
and overestimated the government’s interests.116 The rights at stake
are critical to democracy: the right to associate for the advancement
of political beliefs and the right to meaningfully vote.117 Thus, the
court should apply strict scrutiny to protect these critical rights.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116 n.4.
See id. at 1120.
Id. at 1116 (citing Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011)).
See supra Parts III, V.A–B.
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968).

